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(B)ordering and othering migrants 
by the European Union
Thomas Geisen, Roald Plug and Henk van Houtum
International migration as a field of biopolitics for the European Union
Migration is often a result of societal pressure at the local level. People migrate be­
cause they are searching for better prospects, higher income or status for themselves 
and their relatives, for shelter from persecution or because they are fleeing from politi­
cal, social and ecological catastrophes. When they leave their region of origin, most 
travel to nearby regions or neighbouring states. In 2005 according to UN statistics, 
there were approximately 190 million people (3 per cent o f the world population) who 
were not living in the country of birth. The majority of them live in the geographical 
proximity of their region of origin while only few have the opportunity to travel 
longer, intercontinental distances. Rich societies themselves trigger such Ionger-dis- 
tance refugee and migration movements, by attracting labour -  seasonal or otherwise -  
to work in a number of sectors such as industry, craft, building industry, agriculture, 
hotels, private households and the tourist and sex industry. Europe and North America 
in particular are attractive regions o f destination for migrants, as well as the Gulf 
states, Australia and a number of Asian countries. Significant influences of the destina­
tion and duration o f travel are specific historical (often colonial) relations with the 
countries o f origin and the concomitant political and social practices o f states and 
world regions. Hence, migration processes have to be seen as a complex web in which 
a number of actors with different motives and interests are engaged at different levels, 
for example where migrants are concerned as individuals, families, groups or net­
works. At a political level, actors are engaged in origin as well as destination countries. 
Current debates on migration in destination countries not only contain a general devel­
opment or political dimension, whereby important questions arise as to the entry crite­
ria and purposes. Another dimension is the security dimension in which migration is 
seen to pose dangers and threats to the welfare and wellbeing of the society. As a re­
sult, migration has become a key issue in border police measures. In this chapter, the 
genealogy of the close connection between migration and internal security in the con­
text o f European asylum and migration policies which have contributed to increasingly 
worrying humanitarian crises will be scrutinised and evaluated. To this end, the con­
cept of the development of concrete security and police measures as well as the devel­
opment of a common EU asylum and migration policy will be analysed, which include 
processes of (b)ordering and othering (Van Houtum and Van Naerssen 2002). Stem­
ming from this analysis, in the latter part o f this chapter, critical tensions of the current 
EU immigration policy are discussed.
The development of politics of security at the EU external borders
Over the years, the external border of what sometimes has been labelled Fortress Eu­
rope has become less permeable, in the sense that entry into the EU has become highly 
selective, regulated and secured. Such selective securitisation at the outer borders has 
gone hand in hand with the improvement and further relaxation of more open internal 
borders of the ‘fortress’. With the opening of the (internal) borders on 1 January 1993, 
compensation for the loss' of control and the security deficit in the territory of the EU 
became a priority. Mobile and flexible control had to replace the diminished control at 
the internal borders. We will now look at what we consider to be significant steps in this 
securitisation in the immigration politics at the EU external borders.
The E(J Council in Tampere o f 1999
A major step in the development of the securitisation and communautarisation of the 
EU migration policy was the EU Council in Tampere. Here, notably asylum and migra­
tion issues were on the agenda. At an informal meeting in Berlin in early 1999, a high 
commission^ focusing on asylum and migration was founded and based on the work of 
this commission a concomitant communiqué was released in Tampere. In this commu­
niqué, the goals o f a common EU asylum and migration policy were set. In a press re­
lease in early 1999, Otto Schily, the former German Minister of the Interior (Bun­
desministerium des Innern, BMI), described the priorities o f the high commission as 
follows: ‘The high commission has the task to construct a common integrated concept 
to deal with asylum and migration problems. Special attention will be paid to the funda­
mental causes of migration movements. In action plans, further measures for stronger 
cooperation in the EU with the countries of origin will be drawn up. Among these meas­
ures are political, developmental, economic and humanitarian cooperation, as well as 
conflict prevention and cooperation in terms of the combat against illegal migration and 
organised crime’ (translated from German by the authors). The decision for drawing up 
action plans with the respective countries o f origin is one of the core issues of the EU 
asylum and migration policy. Dr Comelie Sonntag-Wolgast, a parliamentary secretary 
of state in BMI, emphasised this issue in a speech held at a conference to discuss the 
smuggling of refugees on 23 September 1999 in Brussels. In her reference to the up­
coming Tampere conference she emphasised:
The EU council that will take place in October in Tampere will bring up questions that I 
consider important in this respect:
• to intensify the work of the European police authorities
• new initiatives to combat crime
• a common asylum policy and
• to create a European territory of justice.
During the German EU presidency, it was one of the goals o f the EU to come up with a 
common integrated concept for tackling asylum and migration problems. We have to 
analyse the causes o f migration and investigate the circumstances when people are 
tempted to migrate -  prevention in the country of origin must go hand in hand with
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tackling human trafficking. Human trafficking must be dealt with consistently. More 
and more people fall into the hands of illegal trafficking organisations. Therefore, the 
co-operation with Eastern European authorities on a European-wide scale is important. 
On the national level, we have responded to these problems by strengthening border 
protection in order to secure the outer borders after the opening up of Europe (translated 
from BMI 1999). ‘
From the preceding, clearly the protection of the borders is being legitimised and framed 
by a discourse on human rights and measures to stop illegal human trafficking. At the 
1999 informal council meeting for EU interior and justice ministers in Turku, Finland, 
France and Germany issued a joint communiqué concerning asylum and migration and a 
joint approach to combat ‘asylum and migration’ problems was proposed. In the context 
of a further communautarisation of police and legal affairs, EUROPOL has played an im­
portant role. EUROPOL started its work in mid-1999 and it is engaged in building up a 
European enforcement agency. Its goal is to increase the efficiency and co-operation 
among participating states in the context of cross-border crime and illegal trafficking.
At the EU Council meeting in Tampere, participants agreed to a common asylum 
and migration policy (European Council 1999). The work of the high commission ‘Asy­
lum and Migration’ was appreciated and its mandate was extended to include the draw­
ing up of further action plans. In these action plans, a common approach was developed 
for states which were sources of ‘illegal’ migration as well as the transit states. In addi­
tion, the provision of migration alternatives in the corresponding countries themselves 
(within-state migration alternatives) or in the neighbouring regions (régionalisation) 
was regulated. This had huge consequences for the refugees, since their asylum requests 
from now on could be rejected by reference to the regional migration alternatives.
The White Paper o f the European Commission and the Schengen agreement
The initiatives for a common asylum and migration policy in the EU formulated in 
Tampere however did not come out o f the blue. The first signals for such a common 
policy actually go back to the first Schengen agreement and the White Paper to the Eu­
ropean Council of the European Commission in 1985. The Schengen agreement had 
two specific goals: the reduction of common border controls o f goods between the par­
ticipating states and the abolishment o f internal controls of persons, irrespective of their 
origin. The participating countries were Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
and Luxemburg. The Schengen agreement stated that:
In regard to the movement o f persons, the parties shall endeavour to 
abolish the controls at the common frontiers and transfer them to 
their external frontiers. To that end, they shall endeavour to har­
monise in advance, where necessary, the laws and administrative 
provisions concerning the prohibitions and restrictions which form 
the basis for the controls and to take complementary measures to 
safeguard security and combat illegal immigration by nationals of 
states that are not members o f the European Communities (Art 17 
Schengen agreement 1985).
Although the Schengen agreement was initially not part o f the acquis communautaire of 
the European Community, it was incorporated into the Treaty o f Amsterdam in 1997. In 
the same year, the European Commission issued its White Paper on the internal market 
programme. This paper also foresaw a common market without internal borders, focus­
ing on the abolishment of (internal) border controls and the harmonisation of rules. In 
this context, before its meeting in 1999 the European Council was directed to devise a 
system for identification (including fingerprinting) which led to the setting up of Euro- 
dac, the EU’s datasource of fingerprints o f asylum-seekers and ‘illegal’ immigrants. In 
doing so, clearly a prominent step towards the biopolitical control of migrants and se- 
curement of the EU borders -  or what some see as the Big Brotherisation of the fortress 
-  was taken.
Building concentric circles o f security
Another major step in the securing of the borders for immigration was done in 1998, 
when Manfred Matzka, section head of the Austrian Ministry of Domestic Policy intro­
duced an approach towards migration and refugee politics in Europe which has left its 
mark since then. The core of Matzka’s proposal was the building of so-called concentric 
circles of security (FR 4.9.98). These circles were meant to become the security zones of 
the European Union, with each circle being attributed a different political challenge. In 
Matzaka’s view this was the most appropriate response to problems of European migra­
tion and refugee politics. The inner-most circle comprised the Schengen countries that 
were surrounded by a circle of countries that wished to join the European Union, notably 
located in Eastern and southern Europe. The third and outer circle, including countries 
such as Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Turkey and the North African states, were promised 
greater economic co-operation on the condition of co-operation in the areas of transit 
control and the fight against illegal migration. The fourth and last circle, containing the 
most important origin countries o f refugees and migrants to the European Union, would 
be supported with development programmes if their emigration politics accorded and co­
ordinated with the immigration guidelines and politics of the European Union. Over 
time, Matzka’s concentric circles had to be shifted, since most of the Eastern European 
countries became EU member states in 2004 and 2007. However the core of Schengen 
members remained the same. And the ring of countries enjoying greater co-operation has 
shifted towards the ‘new’ EU outer borders: Russia, Belarus, the Ukraine and Moldavia 
in the east and the Mediterranean countries on the African shores in the south. Closer to 
co-operation with those countries has been articulated in the recently launched so-called 
‘European Neighbourhood Policy’ (ENP) (cf. KOM 2004/373 final).
The Barcelona process of 1995 was in fact the first formal ground layer of this rings 
and neighbourhood concept. The Barcelona process was the counterpart o f the EU east­
ern enlargement, but without prospects for entry into the EU. The goal was to eradicate 
poverty and create a space of common well-being with what the EU has labelled the 
‘Ring of friends’. In this ENP country-specific action plans have been elaborated. In a 
common declaration, the following specific goals were introduced: the fight against ille­
gal migration, agreements on taking back illegal migrants, border control systems, co­
operation in migration issues and exchange of information and statistical information 
with regard to migration flows. Moreover, in its strategy paper on the European Neigh­
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bourhood Policy of 2004 the EU Commission identifies ‘border management’ as one of 
its core goals:
Border management is likely to be a priority in most Action Plans 
as it is only by working together that the EU and its neighbours can 
manage common borders more efficiently in order to facilitate le­
gitimate movements. The Action Plans should thus include meas­
ures to improve the efficiency of border management, such as sup­
port for the creation and training of corps of professional non-mili­
tary border guards and measures to make travel documents more 
secure. The goal should be to facilitate movement of persons, whilst 
maintaining or improving a high level of security. (...) Action Plan 
priorities could furthermore include co-operation on migration, asy­
lum, visa policies, measures to combat terrorism, organised crime, 
trafficking in drugs and arms, money laundering and financial and 
economic crime. (KOM 2004/373, p,16f.)
The Hague Program
Another important event in the securitisation of immigration of the EU was The Hague 
Program (HP) of 2004, which was an continuation and extension of the European 
Council of Tampere (1999). In the introduction it was stated that:
The European Council welcomes the results that were achieved in 
the first five-year program. A foundation was constructed for a 
common asylum- and migration policy, the harmonisation of border 
control systems was prepared, the co-operation between police au­
thorities was improved and reciprocal recognition of decisions in 
the field o f justice co-operation was further prepared. (HP, p.9).
With respect to the issue of immigration, unanimous voting still counted, so different 
states could still largely allow their national interests to prevail over the Tampere priori­
ties. The Tampere process was thus seen as a ‘policy of small steps’. In the Treaty of 
Nice (1 February 2003) however, it was decided to abolish unanimous voting in the 
field of asylum policy and a system of qualified majority voting was creating. The re­
form of the EU that was decided in the Nice treaty was accompanied by an eastward ex­
pansion, namely the admission of East European states on 1 May 2004. The securitisa­
tion of the external borders and the preoccupation with internal security in the Hague 
Program can not be seen separately from this EU eastern enlargement, which in a sec­
ond round also included Romania and Bulgaria in January 2007. The new goals for inte­
rior and justice affairs must also be seen in the context o f the terror attacks of Septem­
ber 11, 2001 in New York and March 11, 2004 in Madrid. These events have made in­
ternal security and the fight against terrorism perhaps to one of the top issues in the 
(popular) political debates o f our time.
According to the Hague Program, further measures have to be taken to harmonise 
interior and justice affairs. Important goals are the ‘regulation of migration movements’
and the ‘control o f the external borders of the Union’, in addition to a common asylum 
policy. These goals are embedded in the intention to ‘reinforce the space of freedom, se­
curity and justice’. The Council ordered the EU commission to draw up an action plan 
based on the Hague Program ‘intended to translate the goals and priorities of the pro­
gram into concrete measures’ (HP, p. 11). As priorities for the space of freedom, security 
and justice were determined by the creation of an integrated border system, the commu­
nautarisation of visa policies, the promotion of a common policy for containing migra­
tion and the development of a common EU asylum policy, in addition to the introduc­
tion of police and customs measures. In the fight against terrorism and certain forms of 
crime, the possibility o f using electronic data systems, such as the Visa Information 
System, will be explored (cf. KOM 2004/401).
In the second phase, that started on 1 May 2004, a ‘common asylum system and 
common status have to be introduced, for people who need asylum or protection’ (HP, 
p. 14). At the European level, new structures have to be built, that ‘include asylum offi­
cials in participating states and that will render easier co-operation’ (HP, p. 15). This 
must not only facilitate the introduction of a common approach but also the common 
collection of information on countries of origin. Reciprocal support must relieve pres­
sure on asylum systems and admission capacities (HP, p. 15). These structures must be 
encapsulated in a European support agency, after a common asylum policy has been in­
troduced. A European refugee fund will be created for the period 2005-2010. The core 
concern of the Hague Program is the setting up of a common asylum system of the EU 
in 2010, in which the measures of the EU in the field o f asylum have to be streamlined.
An important part o f the European asylum policy concerns minimum norms in the 
recognition of refugees. Besides concrete measures and proposals for harmonisation of 
asylum systems in the EU, there are criteria regarding ‘safe third countries’ or countries 
o f origin (FAZ 24.10.2004). A secure third state is determined by two factors: (1) on his 
or her flight, the refugee must have resided there and (2) this state has signed the Gene­
va Refugee Convention and has a statutory asylum system. ‘This prerequisite o f a statu­
tory asylum system has as a consequence that this state now has the responsibility in­
stead of the EU for the rejected refugees and migration’ (FAZ 24,10.2004). In this way, 
the bordering o f migrants is placed outside of the EU.
The bordering of asylum seekers outside of the EU is also based on another proposal. 
Increasingly there are thoughts of setting up ‘refugee camps’ in Africa in view of the high 
number of refugees that attempt to enter the EU by ship from Northern Africa. This meas­
ure should be a ‘complementary measure’ so as to ‘relieve’ the EU states from handling 
the asylum requests. France and Sweden are however against this proposal, because they 
fear that ‘mafia structures’ would be created. Morocco and Algeria have already rejected 
the idea of creating refugee camps. The former EU commissioner Vitorino argued in this 
context that Europe does not want to roll off the asylum burden onto third countries, but 
that it wants to share the ‘burden’ with respective countries. There is a distinct tendency 
towards ‘régionalisation’, and concrete measures which aim to ‘régionalisé’ the refugee 
problem have already been taken. The Netherlands and the EU commission are financing 
an initiative of the commissioners of refugees of the United Nations in the form of a ‘pilot 
project’ in five North African countries (Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania) 
that aims to train local personnel for the control of immigration and to implement statuto­
ry asylum systems in the respective countries, (cf. FAZ 1.10.2004).^
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Although on the one hand asylum seekers should be deterred from entering the EU, 
on the other hand migration policies focusing on other target groups to facilitate entry 
into the EU should be adjusted. In this regard the European Council underlines the im­
portance of migration movements for high-skilled labour (HP, p. 15), with the participat­
ing states exercising full control over the entry of labour migrants. At the same time, 
states must counteract the shadow economy as a pull factor for illegal migration. For the 
integration of third-country nationals, equal opportunities must be created and obstacles 
to social integration have to be abolished.
Asylum and migration policy are designated as international affairs in the Hague 
Program. Third countries must be supported by the EU in order to improve the regula­
tion of migration flows and to create border control capacities. In the countries o f ori­
gin, these activities must be connected to measures of development co-operation and 
humanitarian support. The transit countries and transit-régions play an important role 
in the asylum and migration policy of the EU, especially in the south and the east. The 
co-operation must be intensified and the creation of capacities has to be supported, in 
order to contain migration via these countries and to provide shelter for the refugees 
(HP, p.17).
The Hague Program also strives to improve the return and taking-back policy. The 
importance of this policy is underlined by the decision to appoint a special envoy. 
Agreements ‘force’ the participants to take back refugees and migrants that are illegally 
residing in the EU. The EU has already made agreements with Macao, Hong Kong and 
Sri Lanka. Negotiations are underway with Russia, Pakistan, Morocco and Ukraine and 
further negotiations are planned with Turkey, Albania, Algeria and China (KOM 
2003/812, p.7).
Frontex
The EU strives for an integrated border control system at the external borders. For the 
coordination and reinforcements o f border control measures, on 1 May 2005 the Euro­
pean border control agency was created -  ‘Frontex’. Besides EUROPOL, Frontex is 
the second European security authority (Schily 2004, p. 16). This new agency has to 
fulfil the following tasks: carrying out risk analysis; co-ordination of operational co­
operation between member states in the field o f management o f external borders; assis­
tance to member states in the training of national border guards, including the estab­
lishment of common training standards; following up the development o f research rel­
evant for the control and surveillance of external borders; assistance to member states 
in circumstances that require increased technical and operational assistance at external 
borders; providing member states with the necessary support in organising joint repa­
triation operations (including identifying best practices on the acquisition of travel 
documents and the removal of illegal third-country nationals).^ Further steps to im­
prove the border control system such as the use of biometric information and measure­
ments have already been taken to strengthen the existing information systems -  the 
Schengen Information System (SIS) which will be improved and extended in SIS II, 
the Visa Information System (VIS) and the already mentioned Eurodac. In 2005 the 
Commission was ordered to report on the ‘inter-operability’ o f the three systems. 
Based on its findings the efficiency and inter-operability o f these EU information sys-
terns with regard to the ‘fight against illegal migration and the border control systems 
need to be improved’ (HP, p.20). Also the visa policy must be developed as a common • 
system. The goal is to ‘render legal travelling easier and illegal migration more diffi­
cult’ (HP, p.20).
82 Thomas Geisen, Roald Plug and Henk van Houtum
Othering through the communautarisation policy of the EU
Since the Treaty of Amsterdam, all persons from third countries that want to enter the 
EU -  immigrants, asylum seekers and visa applicants -  have been put in a single cate­
gory. Despite the qualitative differences in their motives to enter the EU, they are in­
creasing being viewed as a homogeneous group.This development typifies the EU secu­
rity discourse of the last decade or so. The geopolitical developments o f the past decade 
and especially post-September 11 events have led to a huge concern over the internal 
security. In this context and under a dominant discourse and perspective of a desire for 
‘security’, all persons from third countries are seen as a potential threat.
Combining immigrants, asylum seekers and visa applicants into one group could be 
seen as a form of ‘non-EU’ stratification or ‘othering’. Most illustrative here is that the 
European Commission has compiled two lists: one list of states whose nationals do not 
require a visa and another list o f countries whose citisens require a visa to enter the 
EU. On the so-called ‘black’ (sic!) list, there are 134 states (including Taiwan and 
Palestine) (out o f a total o f approximately 195 states on this planet). The group of 
countries is extremely large and heterogeneous at first glance; but the most striking 
features are that, with the exception of Brunei, all Muslim and most o f the poor states 
are on that list. All African states are listed, as well as most of the Caribbean and the 
less prosperous states in Latin America and Asia (Regulation no. 539/2001 of the 
Council OJ 2001 L81).
The development o f frontiers ’ o f  EU-civilisation
A striking example of the implications of the current EU’s border policy is a particular 
border that has received a lot o f attention in the media, namely the border between the 
Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla and the state of Morocco. In recent years, the en­
claves have been fortified with barbed wire, spotlights and closed circuit television. It is 
a joint Spanish-EU project and it has been described by some commentators as ‘mili­
tary’ (Walters 2002, p.568). In 1995, US$ 29 million were spent on this project (Tunan- 
der 1997, p.40). For the period of 2004-2006, the EU will spend ?140 million on the 
fortification of its external borders (European Council o f Thessaloniki 2003). The 
Southern border with the Maghreb countries and the Middle East signifies a ‘Muslim 
Other’ that is perhaps grounded in the perception of the Ottoman Empire as Europe’s 
historical ‘Other’, added to which is the contemporary media construction of a terrorist 
universe in the Muslim world (Tunander 1997). With regard to the eastern border with 
Russia the debate in the EU focuses on the perceived Russian unfamiliarity with values 
as democracy and human rights (Tunander 1997). It seems that after retreat o f the com­
munists from the political arena in Europe, the EU has now created new barbaric and 
constitutive others, new folk devils, in the form of Muslims. In this context, the external
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borders of the EU are increasingly being considered as frontiers. A frontier is a place of 
confrontation between a (social) system and its environment (Langer 1999, p.28). On 
the other side of the external border of the EU, one’s ‘own’ civilisation comes to an end 
and other civilisations start. In the same way as state borders have co-constructed na­
tional identities, the new external borders of the EU are now used to construct an EU 
identity as opposed to the folk devils o f this era.
Conclusion: the humanitarian costs of ‘a space of freedom, security and justice’
The EU is increasingly creating formidable security-obsessed state-like borders around 
its entity. Yet, it is unclear as to whether the EU is indeed to be understood as one single 
state and what the humanitarian and global costs are o f this policy. The new borders -  
and therefore the limits -  of the EU as a (federal) state are not clear, but the boundaries 
that are believed to help create the identity of the EU as a region are becoming more 
and more visible. The borders that define the ‘Other’ and keep ‘them’ at a distance are 
becoming all the more distinct and visible. Strategies such as the introduction of the Eu­
ro, the EU flag, the EU passport, the ‘discovery’ of the external borders, the invention 
of the frontier of civilisation and the transfer of sovereignty by member states in general 
all (must) help to create a sense of belonging in this ‘space of freedom, security and jus­
tice’, that the EU wishes to be. The (military) fortifications of the borders of the EU 
with the Maghreb and the Middle East, the rhetoric of ‘othering’ and the concrete exclu­
sion of asylum seekers and immigrants also play an important role in reinforcing the 
idea of an own, unique EU identity. The idea is that ein EU identity alongside the exist­
ing spatial identities can help fine-tune the internal market programme and contribute to 
this desired ‘space of freedom, security and justice’. The communautarisation of the im­
migration and asylum policy is an important goal in this respect for the EU. Without 
this communautarisation process, the vision of a perfectly functioning internal market 
remains a mirage in the horizon. Despite the increasing effort to help foster an EU iden­
tity, it is by no means clear what this EU identity is, according to the EU, except that it 
is apparently not ‘barbaric’ or ‘Muslim’ or ‘poor’, categorisations that are attributed to 
the Other.
The security-obsessed politics o f immigration is increasingly seen as a war, in the 
same vein as today’s war on terror and drugs. As a result o f the restrictive migration 
policy in the EU that can be characterised as a ‘no entry’ policy, new forms of crime 
have arisen, for example the trafficking that is organised by illegal trafficking 
networks.^ The ongoing measures for ‘securing the borders’ do not only have desired 
but also opposite effects: the more difficult it is to cross the border, the more migrants 
need support. Migration support becomes a service that is financially attractive to offer 
and one that is supplied at higher costs.-’
Increasingly, largely because of higher security measures in border and immigration 
policies, immigration has become a severe humanitarian problem (Van Houtum and Pi­
jpers 2007). At the European external borders we see humanitarian catastrophes every­
day, and not only in the Mediterranean Sea, but also on the continent. Recent figures es­
timate that 6,000 refugees and migrants died while trying to reach the Canary Islands 
from West Africa in 2006: one out o f six migrants that head for the islands.
To conclude, the argument that we have brought forward here is that immigrants and 
asylum seekers are most likely to become victims of process' of politics o f security and. 
well-being of the EU. The EU is increasingly bordering and ordering a domain on the 
global map where at least the members enjoy freedom, security, and justice, but at in­
creasingly higher humanitarian costs for the excluded others. They, the excluded Others, 
are thereby increasingly being made scapegoats in an attempt to foster social and eco­
nomic integration in the EU, a process which is accompanied by a distinct process of 
‘othering’. The EU is taking a slippery and increasingly arbitrary route to define itself in 
this era of its development.
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Notes
1. ‘Hochrangige Gruppe’.
2. The cost of this ‘pilot project’ is ?1 million, 80 per cent of which is from the EU budget (FAZ 
1.10.2004). In light of the EU’s attempts to régionalisé the refugee problem, the creation of 
functioning asylum system is of huge importance, since it would mean that the North African 
states would have their own asylum systems and in the logic of the ‘safe third states’ it will be 
increasingly difficult for refugees to find their way to Europe.
3. Cf. Frontex: www.frontex.europoa.eu/origin_and_tasks/tasks/ (25.01.2007).
4. It is interesting to note that human illegal trafficking was regarded positively in the period be­
fore 1989 when people fled from socialist states, in particular the German Democratic Re­
public. Nowadays this practice is no longer applauded.
5. According to statistics from 1998, migrants and refugees paid the following rates (in US$ and 
per person) for their passage: China-Europe (10,000-15,000), China-USA (30,000), Pak- 
istan/India-USA (25,000), Bulgaria-Europe (4000), Turkey-Greece (1,400), Kurdish regions- 
Germany (3,000), North Africa-Spain (2,000-3,500) (Abou Chabaké 2000, p. 140).
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Abstract
The EU expansion o f  2004 to the East and Southeast has transferred the geographical 
coordinates o f  this security concept to the east, this concept is still valid. Migration and
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asylum politics are essential to the security concept of the EU. Asylum and migration 
are seen and treated as de facto  problems for the internal security. This focus has ' 
strengthened since the opening of the internal EU borders for capital, goods and per­
sons. According to the ‘Hague program’ (2004), further measures have to be taken for 
the harmonisation in the field of interior- and justice affairs. Important goals are the 
‘regulation of migration movements’ and the ‘control o f the external borders o f the 
Union’, next to a common asylum policy. Immigrants, asylum-seekers and individuals 
from poorer regions that wish to come to the EU, have become part of a construction of 
the ‘Other’ on behalf of creating a feeling of security and imagining an own identity. 
The European Union commences a restrictive common immigration and asylum-policy 
in order to exclude the ‘Other’, a process which goes to the heart of the EU integration 
process.
